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This theoretical paper looks into joint determination of corruption and development 
where there is a decentralised bureaucratic setup in a multi-tiered system: tier one bureaucrats 
and tier two bureaucrats. Corruption takes place at two levels, firstly when tier one bureaucrats 
collude with households for tax evasion, and secondly when tier one and tier two bureaucrats 
collude to hide corruption. This paper determines that at high levels of corruption, there is low 
development, and at a low incidence of corruption, there is high development. This paper 
postulates that for a developing country like Pakistan, low tax collection due to poor 
institutional decentralisation leads to low economic growth and development. 
JEL Classifications: E02, E26, E42 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, there has been much concern that corruption in government 
seems to have a negative impact on economic growth and development. According to 
Nawaz, Iqbal and Khan (2014) institutions with well-defined mechanisms will curb 
corruption and promote economic growth and development. Controlling corruption in 
democratic institutions is growth enhancing (Khan, 1996; Nawaz, Iqbal & Khan, 2014; 
Iqbal & Daly, 2014). In an economy, institutions are one of the main drivers of 
investment and economic development (Knack & Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Rose-
Ackerman, 1996; Barro, 1997).  
An institution’s impact on growth comes from economic development that 
depends on cultural and social norms, which vary across countries (Alonso & 
Garcimartin, 2013). Leys (1965) points out that in certain economies (Africa) where 
public offices are elaborate but inefficient, corruption helps to cut red tape in public 
projects and may be the only way to speed up the development process. 
Well-defined democratic measures (rules, regulation and accountability) are 
necessary for institutions that are responsible for revenue collection and public 
expenditure. Tax collection is the main source of revenue collection. Pakistan has a low 
tax base and revenue collection has shown a fluctuating trend and, at 10 percent, is one of 
the lowest in the world (Iqbal, Din & Ghani, 2012).  The probable reason for low tax 
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collection is (1) an improperly designed tax system, and (2) tax evasion by individuals. 
Tax evasion when combined with low institutional quality leads to poor accountability of 
public officials and would increase corruption resulting in low economic development 
(Wade, 1982; Iqbal, Din & Ghani, 2012).  
Fiscal decentralisation, a growing phenomenon in developed and developing 
economies, is devolution of power between central and provincial governments. The role 
of the provincial government is revenue collection and provision of public goods and 
services. In developed economies, fiscal decentralisation is accompanied with well-
structured rules and regulations for accountability (U.S.A, Canada, Europe) (Yilmaz, 
1999). Pakistan over the years has tried to strengthen fiscal decentralisation (e.g.: 
Niemeyer Award 1947, Raisman Award 1952, One Unit formula 1961,1965 and NFC 
Award 1990, 1996, 2006, 2009). According to Iqbal, Din and Ghani (2012) revenue 
decentralisation has a positive impact on economic growth while expenditure 
decentralisation has a negative impact.  
According to Blackburn, Bose and Haque (2010), the public sector suffers from 
corruption due to delegation of power from government to bureaucrats (principal-agent 
relationship). This transference of power allows subordinates to use their judgment in 
decision-making. In an economy where institutions are weak, such delegation of power 
gives incentive to bureaucrats to capture economic rents through bribery (Bardhan, 1997; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1998). Becker and Stigler (1974) state that if government employees are 
paid a higher wage, it would act as a deterrent to corruption.  
Wadho (2009) in his paper states that efficiency wage lowers the level of 
dishonesty in the public sector. Furthermore, literature on corruption and welfare 
efficiency focuses on deterring corruption through partial equilibrium in microeconomic 
environment where the focus has been the cause and repercussion of corruption, (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 1978, 1999). Evidence in theoretical papers 
shows that there is a negative relationship between corruption and growth (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993; Barreto & Alm, 2003; and Wadho, 2013). Empirical literature shows that 
economies with a high incidence of corruption have low economic growth and 
development (Mauro, 1995, 1997; Mo, 2001).  
There is not much literature on the joint determination of corruption and economic 
growth and development in a decentralised bureaucratic system. This paper aims to form 
a link between fiscal decentralisation with poor democratic measures of low tax 
collection, and their impact on capital investment with its repercussions for economic 
growth and development. 
Iqbal, Din and Ghani (2012) state that in fiscal decentralisation the central 
government can appoint provincial governments to check on public goods and services. 
However, the problem remains unaddressed if the central government itself is corrupt. 
Therefore, this paper attempts to fill in the gaps in existing literature by exploring 
corruption in tax compliance under a decentralised bureaucratic setup, where the tax 
department has two grades of employees: tier-two bureaucrats (superiors) and tier-one 
bureaucrats (tax collectors).  
Tier-two bureaucrats delegate the responsibility of tax collection from households 
(private individuals) to tier-one bureaucrats. Tier-one bureaucrats can collude with 
households to hide their true taxable income or pay less/no tax by receiving a bribe. Tier-
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one bureaucrats can also collude with tier-two bureaucrats to hide the corruption (low tax 
revenue collected) from the government.  
The remaining paper is organised as follows: 
 Section 2 elaborates on the past empirical theoretical literature.  
 Section 3 gives a description of the economy with model setup.  
 Section 4 analyses the incentives for corruption.  
 Section 5 elaborates on equilibriums of the model.  
 Section 6 looks at the two-way relationship between corruption and economic 
growth and development. 
 Section 7 gives comparative statistics. 
 Section 8 discusses the finding and conclusion. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Disparate institutional quality is the main reason for changing capital 
accumulation, human capital, and economic development and growth across countries 
(Hall & Jones, 1997). Institutions with democratic mechanisms have a positive impact on 
growth. Corruption is defined as misuse of public office for private gains (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993; Barreto, 2000; Banerjee, Mullainathan & Hanna, 2012). Efficient and 
uncorrupt institutions make sure that labour is employed in productive projects, not 
wasted in rent seeking activities (North, 1990; Iqbal & Daly, 2014). If the rules and 
regulations governing institutions are not properly defined, labour becomes involved in 
low return economic projects, which in turn lowers growth, (Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993).  
According to Nawaz, Iqbal and Khan (2014) as institutional quality improves, 
corruption decreases and income in the economy increases, and vice versa. The impact of 
institutions varies across Asian economies depending on the level of economic 
development. Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Triesman (2000) show by empirical studies 
that corruption not only affects institutions, but also is intensified by weak institutions. 
A corrupt economy has inefficient institutions that appear in the form of weak 
legislative and judicial systems along with bureaucratic red tape, which dampens 
economic growth (North, 1990; Mo, 2001; Aidt, 2009). Unequal distribution and 
misallocated resources in a corrupt economy slow down growth and lower living 
standards (Blackburn, Bose & Haque, 2010). According to Barreto and Alm (2003), 
public officials are repeatedly found to be self-seeking, abusing their public position for 
personal gains. Their actions include demanding bribes to issue licenses, exchange of 
money for awarding contracts, stealing from the public treasury and selling government 
owned commodities in the black economy. 
Empirical literature focuses on corruption, transparency and economic growth. 
Studies indicate that countries that have a higher degree of corruption are less transparent 
fiscally and experience low levels of GDP per capita. Fiscal decentralisation classifies 
government into tiers where the local government acts as a subordinate tier in a multi-
tiered system. This paper uses the definition of fiscal decentralisation from the works of 
Bjedov and Madies (2010) where decentralisation is deconcentration: giving power to 
agents to exercise in certain boundaries but answerable to a central government, 
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delegation: transfer of power to the agent to be exercised for certain responsibilities, and 
devolution: transfer of power and responsibility to chosen agents through election.  
The principle roles and responsibilities of each tier are clearly defined (Shah & 
Shah, 2007; Bjedov & Madies, 2010). According to Amagoh and Amin (2012) the 
classification of government into such tiers improves efficiency levels with economic 
growth and output. In a corrupt economy, the advantages of decentralisation are 
overshadowed by the disadvantages of poor accountability and inefficiency. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) point out that delegation of power results in dispersion of government 
decision-making, which leads to lack of coordination and thus rent extraction.  
Enikolopov and Zhuraasvkaya (2003) find that a strong party system is beneficial 
for decentralisation in less developed economies for better provision of public goods, 
government quality, and economic growth. According to Iqbal, Din and Ghani (2012) 
fiscal decentralisation increases accountability and transparency in the political process 
and lowers corruption. Fan, Lin, and Triesman (2009) find that increased government 
tiers lead to bribery in government contracts and public services (utilities and customs). 
Fiscal decentralisation of revenue generation in Pakistan has had a positive impact on 
growth while the decentralisation of expenditure has had a negative impact (Igbal, Din & 
Ghani, 2012).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) elaborate that corruption is expensive. The demand for 
secrecy shifts the country’s investment away from high value projects in health and 
education, towards potentially low value projects in infrastructure (Mauro, 1997). Mauro 
(1995) finds that corruption lowers private investment, thereby reducing economic 
growth. Mo (2001) established that economic growth decreases by 0.72 percent when 
corruption increases by 1 percent. Corruption reduces sustainable development by 
reduced growth in genuine wealth (Aidt, 2009). However, Khan (1996) points out rent 
seeking activities that allow the economic agents to sidestep restrictive monopolies 
actually improve the welfare of the economy thus leading to economic growth (Leff, 
1964; Leys, 2017).  
Revenue generation through taxes is one of the main source of infrastructural 
development in an economy. Barro (1991) states that government services (utility and 
production) financed by taxes enhance growth. Tax revenue is utilised for public and 
physical capital investment, which converts raw material into output. Romer (1994) states 
that as physical capital increases, an economy moves towards high growth. Increased 
physical capital leads to spillovers, leading to economic growth and development (Solow, 
1994). 
Tax evasion is a form of corruption, which has a varied impact on economic 
growth. Lin and Yang (2001) in static model analysis shows that at a low taxation level, 
the extent of tax evasion is small and growth decreases. Furthermore, the dynamic model 
showed that an increase in taxation allows tax evasion leading to increased saving, 
investment, and growth in an economy. Eichhorn (2001) shows that tax evasion is 
beneficial for growth as households evade taxes only if it is profitable and leads to 
increased savings. The lack of provision of public goods does not have an impact on 
growth. 
Corruption negatively affects savings, which in turn affects investment. Since 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the savings of foreigners in a foreign country, the 
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corruption in the destination country cannot affect the saving decisions of FDI of host 
countries. In this case, if FDI is a bigger share of total investment then corruption might 
have negligible effects on investment. However, literature on FDI and corruption 
highlights that corrupt economies are not attractive destinations for FDI.
1
 
According to Wei (2000) international investors do not find it worthwhile to invest 
in economies where the corruption index is high. A country’s investment environment is 
measured through its institutional quality, which is an indicator of political institutions, 
rule of law, property rights, non-transparency and instable economic policies. If the 
institutional quality of a country were poor, then FDI in that country would be low for it 
creates operational inefficiencies (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Habib & Zurawicki, 
2002). Corruption lowers the productivity of public inputs leading to a decrease in the 
country’s locational attractiveness, which is an important factor for foreign investment 
(Egger & Winner, 2005). The location plays an important role when investors are 
deciding on host countries from an investment point of view. 
Ehrlich and Lui (1999) developed a model where the prospect of corruption in the 
public sector allows individuals to become a part of government and thus divert economic 
rents towards rent seeking activities rather than growth enhancing projects. Similarly Sarte 
(2000) talks about rent seeking individuals that hinder progress in the formal sector’s security 
and property rights, and promote the informal sector with less security.  
Blackburn, Bose and Haque (2010) (hereafter BBH) in their neoclassical growth 
model employ bureaucrats as agents of the government for tax collection. Corruption, as 
bribery and tax evasion, takes place amongst tax collectors and households. The bribery 
goes undetected because of poor monitoring by the government. Wadho (2009) uses the 
endogenous monitoring where corruption by tax collectors can be caught.  Corruption 
takes hold when corrupt tax collectors match corrupt households.  In addition, efficiency 
wage ensures that corruption does not take place. In case corruption does take place 
because of lower wages then effective auditing will report the corruption to the 
government.  
The population setup and external monitoring is similar to the Wadho model, 
while the tax collectors and household setup is same as the BBH model, but this paper 
adds tier-two bureaucrats to the model. The tax administrative department is two tiered; 
tier-two bureaucrats, as effective auditors, are hired by the government for monitoring tax 
collection and maintaining a corruption free environment, while the government hires 
tier-one bureaucrats, known tax collectors, for tax collection from households. Taxes are 
collected from high-income household at the tax rate determined by the government. 
Tier-one and tier-two bureaucrats have the opportunity to be corrupt. The two 
levels of corruption are: 1) bribes that tier-one bureaucrats receive from households to be 
reported as low income and to pay low/no taxes. 2) Payoff to tier-two bureaucrats by tier-
one bureaucrats during audit, if they are caught. The payoffs amongst the bureaucrats are 
decided through Nash bargaining, (Cerqueti & Coppier, 2009). The focus of this model is 
not just tax collection but also the saving of the economy as it leads to economic growth. 
This model shows that investment in equilibrium with corruption is low compared to 
investment in equilibrium with no corruption. In addition, public goods are rival and non-
excludable and the agents in the economy live for two time periods and two generations.  
 
1The actual FDI is lower than the potential FDI. 
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3.  FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1.  The Environment-Economy  
This paper builds a stylised model using an overlapping generation model where 
each generation consists of constant population N, who lives for two time periods and are 
risk neutral. A proportion θ(0,1) of agents are corruptible, i.e. they will be corrupt if it 
pays them to be corrupt and the remaining fraction (1–) is not corruptible, who 
irrespective of the monetary gains will stay honest. Agents of each generation are divided 
into three sets; private individuals referred to as households of which there is a fixed 
measure n, for the purpose of collecting taxes there is a fixed mass of m tax collectors 
classified as tier one bureaucrats. The hiring and overseeing of the tier-one bureaucrats is 
done by a fixed mass s of tier two bureaucrats (known as super auditors) where n>m>s 
and n+m+s=N.  
In the economy, households are differentiated based on their labour endowment, 
which determines their relative income and their propensity to be taxed. A fraction μ 
𝜖 (0,1), of households are endowed with ɛ >1 units of labour (high income bracket) who 
are liable to pay a proportional tax (0,1) which is decided by the government, while 
the remaining fraction (1- μ) have labour endowment ɛ =1(low income bracket) and they 
are not liable to pay any taxes. 
The government is aware of the total  without knowing the individual taxes due 
by households. This paper assumes that both tier-one and tier-two bureaucrats are not 
liable to pay taxes, i.e. they are low type, whereas tier-two gets a premium 𝜐 <  ɛ. 2 The 
tax is collected by the tier-one bureaucrats from 
2𝑛
2𝑚
 households. At the first level, 
corruption takes place when the tax collector conspires with households to conceal their 
information about their true income. In this scenario, the tax collector expects a gain in 
the form of a bribe and households expect gains in the form of tax evasion. There is a 
fraction (0,1) of tax collectors that are corrupt in this way and the remaining fraction 
(1–λ) are honest (non-corrupt). At the second level, corruption happens during the annual 
audit when this misreporting is revealed to tier-two bureaucrats. Assuming that if the 
superior bureaucrat is honest, the corrupt tier-one bureaucrat is reported and punished. 
When the corrupt tier-one bureaucrat matches up with corruptible tier-two bureaucrats, 
the tier-two bureaucrat does not reveal this misreporting, and the tax collector pays a 
share out of total bribes determined through Nash bargaining to superiors.  
All agents in the society work (save) during the first time period and consume in the 
second time period. Firms are responsible for the output production, of which there is 
continuum of unit mass. The households provide the labour for hiring to the firms and the 
firms hire the rent capital from all agents of the society. All markets are perfectly competitive. 
 
3.2.  Households  
Households of generation i = (1,2) at time period t earn income Ii,t by supplying 
their labour to firms in the private market and earn wages, wi,t. Each household faces a 
linear utility function of its expected income. A household which has labour endowment 
 
2This is to simplify the model and it does not affect the qualitative results of this model. 
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ɛ=1 earns labour income wi in each time period and are exempted from taxes. Households 
with labour endowments ɛ >1 earn labour income ɛwi and pay proportional tax τ to the 
government. Both the high income and low-income households save their current wages 
at the prevailing market interest rate for the next time period rt+1 that is received in the 
next period to be consumed with the next period wages. For the time period t+1 the 
income for the household is Iit+1 and the wages are wi,t+1, as this model will show in the 
steady state where wi,t = wi,t+1.  
This paper focuses only on high-income households, as they are the ones who are 
liable for taxes and could collude with the tax collectors (tier-one bureaucrats) for tax 
evasion. Honest households do not evade taxes such that their net income equal to wi,t  
(1–) + rt+1 wi,t (1–) + wi,t+1 (1–). Since in the steady state wi,t = wi,t+1, for the next 
section onwards this paper uses w without the subscript. For corruptible households, 
income is uncertain and depends on the bribe that they pay to bureaucrat and the 
probability of being caught. With probability p their corruption is detected through audit. 
This model assumes that the effective probability depends on the type of tier two 
bureaucrats. With probability , tax collector matches with a corruptible tier-two 
bureaucrat. In this case, the tier-two bureaucrat does not reveal this corruption and they 
bargain on the share of bribes that each of them receives. Given this setup the effective 
probability of being caught p(1–)  (0,1). Assuming that when detected, a corrupt 
household is asked to pay its taxes. Given this, the net income of corruptible household is 
E(I;b,r) = {
𝜀𝑤(1 − 𝜏)(2 + 𝑟𝑡+1),                                               𝑖𝑓  𝑏 = 0
𝜀𝑤(2 + 𝑟𝑡+1)(1 − 𝑏𝑡 − 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)𝜏),                    𝑖𝑓𝑏 > 0
 … (1) 
Where 𝑏 >0 implies that the household is involved in corruption. 
 
3.3.  Tax Collectors—Tier One Bureaucrats  
Tax collectors differ in their behaviour in public offices. They supply their unit 
endowment of labour to government inflexibly and earn wages equal to, 𝑤𝑔 in each time 
period. Any bureaucrat (corruptible or non-corruptible) working for a firm, while 
supplying one labour unit to receive a non-taxable wage equal to the wage paid to 
households. Therefore, any bureaucrat who is willing to accept a wage less than the stated 




Each bureaucrat has 
2𝜇𝑛
2𝑚
 households under his jurisdiction. Honest bureaucrats do 
not indulge in corruption and earn a lifetime income, 𝑤𝑔(2 + 𝑟𝑡+1). Whereas, corruptible 




 to the corrupt tax collector.  Further, this model assumes that an honest 
household even when it encounters a corrupt bureaucrat refuses to collude and declares 
its true income. Thus, with probability 𝜃 , a corruptible tax collector matches with a 
corruptible household who pays him a bribe (b) and colludes to hide its true income. 
A fraction λ 𝜖 (0,1) of corruptible tax collectors are corrupt and demand bribes to 
conceal information about households’ income. The income of the corrupt bureaucrat is 
 
3See Blackburn, Bose and Haque, 2010 for more discussion. 
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uncertain and depends on chances of being caught. If caught then the fine constitutes the 
bribe they receive, penalty associated with being corrupt, and the return they get on their 
investment from the bribe income. They face an effective probability 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)  of being 
caught through audit. Particularly, with probability (1-θ) tax inspector matches with 
honest, tier-two superior, who reports his corruption. With probability θ tax inspector 
matches with corruptible tier two bureaucrats, who demands a share φ 𝜖 (0,1) from bribe 
income to conceal his corruption. 
Assuming that the tax inspector is willing to pay this share and its value is 
determined through Nash bargaining. Since, corruption is illegal, tax inspector hides the 
illegal income, and given the opportunity tax collector will try to utilise it by converting it 
into black or white money. If the money goes into to the formal sector the chances of 
being caught are high, as the source income needs to be identified. Therefore, the corrupt 
tax collector treats the money as black money and invests in the informal market or in 
those sectors where the probability of being caught is low or zero. To keep up with the 
growth model money is not left idle. The black money is invested in the market at rate of 
return which is smaller and is equal to 𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝜌, where 𝜌 > 0. 4 
This paper assumes that when tax inspectors are caught through the audit, their 
entire income is confiscated which constitutes their earnings and the bribe they have 
received from the household. Given this the expected net income of a corruptible tax 
inspector is: 
𝐸(𝐼; 𝑏, 𝑟) = {
𝑤𝑔(2 + 𝑟𝑡+1)                                                                                                      𝑏 = 0
[1 − 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)] {𝑤𝑔(2 +  𝑟𝑡+1) + (2 + 𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝜌) (
𝜃𝜇𝑛
𝑚
) 𝜀𝑤𝑏𝑡(1 − 𝜑)} , 𝑏 > 0    
 (2) 
 
3.4.  Super Auditors—Tier Two Bureaucrats  
Tier two bureaucrats supply their labour to the government and earn wages equal 
to 𝜐𝑤𝑔, where 1< 𝜐 < 𝜀. This implies that tier two bureaucrats are paid a higher wage 
than tier one bureaucrat is, whereas, for simplicity this paper assumes that they do not 
pay taxes. Honest tier two bureaucrats do not collude with tax inspectors and they earn 
only wage income, whereas, corruptible tier two bureaucrats collude with corrupt tax 
inspectors and their income is uncertain. The bribe income of tier two bureaucrats 







) since m > s there would be 
𝑚
𝑠
 tax collectors under tier two bureaucrats. 
Symmetric to tier one bureaucrat, it is assumed that when tier two bureaucrats are caught 
being corrupt, their entire income is confiscated, and they invest their bribe income in 
black market with smaller returns. Given this, the expected net income of tier two 
bureaucrats is: 
𝐸(𝐼; 𝑏, 𝑟) = {
𝜐𝑤𝑔(2 + 𝑟𝑡+1),                                                                          𝜑  = 0, 𝑏 = 0   
(1 − 𝑝) [𝜐𝑤𝑔(2 + 𝑟𝑡+1) + (2 + 𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝜌) (
𝜃𝜇𝑛
𝑠
) 𝜀𝑤𝑏𝜑] , 𝜑 > 0, 𝑏 > 0
 (3) 
 
4 Assumption for this model. 
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3.5.  Government 
The government provides public goods through revenues, which are collected 
through levying a proportional tax on high-income households, along with the fine that is 
collected from tier one and tier two bureaucrats when they are caught being corrupt. The 
government audits the conduct of bureaucrats that costs its resources.  
For simplicity, this model assumes that the cost of auditing is equal to revenues 
collected through successful auditing. The government assigns a fixed proportion, Φ ϵ (0, 
1) of tax revenue generated on public goods, 𝐺𝑡 and the remaining portion to the payment 
of wages to tier one and tier two bureaucrats. Given that no corruptible bureaucrat would 
ever reveal himself in the way described above, therefore, to minimise the labour costs 
the government sets the wages of all bureaucrats equal to the wages households receive 
from the private firms to ensure complete bureaucratic participation, (Blackburn et.al, 
2010). 
 
3.6.  Firms  







𝛼   … … … … … … (4) 
When there is congestion of the public services (Barro & Sala-I-Martin, 1992), such that 
𝐺𝑡 =
𝐺
𝐾⁄ , where G is the quantity of the public services and K is the private capital 
available to the private firms. Public goods are rival and non-excludable i.e. there is 
congestion
5










 … … … … … … (5) 
Where A>0, α ,β ϵ (0, 1), β + α < 1. Also 𝐿𝑡 is the labour of the economy and 𝐾𝑡 is the 
capital of the economy. Firms hire the labour from the households at competitive wage 






𝛼  … … … … … … (6) 





𝛼 … … … … … (7) 
 
4.  THE INCENTIVE TO BE CORRUPT 
This paper looks into the behaviour of households, tax collectors and tier two 
bureaucrats in the environment of tax evasion and bribery
6
. In a two-dimensional 
problem where tier one bureaucrats decide whether to be corrupt or not and later to 
decide on the minimum bribe that is acceptable to them while considering the share 𝜑 
that they would have to give to tier two bureaucrats in order to evade being caught 
through the effective auditing. The share of bribe φ is decided between tax collector and 
 
5Relative congestion: you benefit from the public good if you utilise it, otherwise there is no impact on 
the non-user utility. 
6This model looks at the economy in equilibrium such that wg= w as stated wage to private and public 
agents is same.  
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tier two bureaucrats through the Nash bargaining. The point where they will both agree 
will decide the share.  
By including bargaining in this, a tax collector maximises the net benefits from 
this collusion. If he colludes, the effective probability of being caught is smaller. It is 
equal to p(1 – ) because his corruption can only be revealed if he matches with honest 
auditor. However, he will have to share the bribe income with a corrupt auditor. 
Moreover, if he does not collude, he is going to be caught with probability 
(𝑝) irrespective of who is the auditor. Given this the net gains of colluding for tax 
collector with tier two bureaucrat are: 
∆𝐵1 = {𝑝𝜃𝑤(2 +  𝑟𝑡+1) + (2 +  𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝜌) (
θ𝜇𝑛
𝑚
) εw𝑏([1 − 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)] − [1 − 𝑝])}
01
 … (8)  
Similarly, net gains of tier two bureaucrats from this collusion is: 
∆𝐵2 =  {[𝜐𝑤(2 +  𝑟𝑡+1) + (2 +  𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝜌) (
𝜃𝜇𝑛
𝑠
) 𝜀𝑤𝑏𝜑] − 𝜐𝑤(2 +  𝑟𝑡+1)}
𝑂2
      … (9)  
𝜑𝑁𝐵 =  ∆𝐵2. ∆𝐵1 
Keeping this in mind following share of bribe is given as:  












] … … … (10) 
From the above expression, this model establishes the share of bribe tier two 
bureaucrats demand of the tax collectors. The comparative statistics 
𝜕(𝜑𝑁𝐵)
𝜕𝑂2
> 0, which 




< 0 we see that if the bargaining power of the tax collectors increases, 
the share in bribe of tier two collectors would decrease. The increase in the rate of 
interest, the bribe and the proportion of corruptible agents have a negative impact on the 
share of tier two bureaucrats on bribe, (
𝜕(𝜑𝑁𝐵)
𝜕 𝑟𝑡+1






< 0 ). If the 
probability of being caught were to increase, the share would also increase to cover the 




Tax collectors are corrupt only when the expected utility from getting a bribe 
leaves them no worse than not getting a bribe. The bribe would be large enough to cover 
the risk and share of tier two bureaucrats. This model finds that a corruptible tax collector 








 … … … … (11) 
The second incidence of corruption happens when the tax collectors and the 
households collude together to hide the true extent of the household’s income. The 
corrupt high-income households will be willing to pay a bribe as long as it feasible for 
them, such that expected utility from paying the bribe and the expected utility from not 
paying is at least equal. Keeping this in mind the optimum bribe rate for the households is 
calculated through Equation (1) and is estimated to be 
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 𝑏𝑡
∗ = [1 –  𝑝(1 − 𝜃)]𝜏𝑡 … … … … … … (12) 
Equation 12 states that the households will not pay the tax collectors more than 
they expect to save from tax evasion. In this model, incidence of corruption happens only 
when the tax collectors and the households concur on the same bribe such that they 
simultaneously satisfy one another, this is seen when equation (11) and (12) are solved 
together: 






 … … … (13) 
The above condition relies on the economy wide variable 𝜏 and 𝑟𝑡+1. The current 
tax rate and the future market interest rate are of interest; determined by the current 
economic situation in the economy. The prevalent economic condition in the economy 
accounts for corruption in my model. The current statistics show the presence of 
corruption will provide incentive to the upcoming bureaucrats. The current time period t 
corruption will determine the future corruption, which in return determines the future 
market interest rate.   
The behaviour of the economy is analysed under two scenarios 1) economy 
where there is no corruption and 2) economy where there is corruption. Furthermore, 
the model looks into the behaviour of capital in steady state alone such that 𝑌1,𝑡 =
𝑌1,𝑡+1 and 𝑌2,𝑡 = 𝑌2,𝑡+1  and 𝑌1,𝑡 = 𝑌1,𝑡+1 = 𝑌2,𝑡 = 𝑌2,𝑡+1 =Y and 𝐾1,𝑡 = 𝐾1,𝑡+1 and 
𝐾2,𝑡 = 𝐾2,𝑡+1  and 𝐾1,𝑡 = 𝐾1,𝑡+1 = 𝐾2,𝑡 = 𝐾2,𝑡+1 =K. Solving the equation (3), (4) and 
(5) current market interest rate and the current wage in the market is calculated. 
Where 𝑤 = 𝛽𝐿−1𝛹𝐾𝜒 and 𝑟 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝛹𝐾𝜒−1this shows that the economy-wide 
variable relies on the labour force in the market along with the labour and capital 
share in the output function. Furthermore, the presence of 𝐾 shows that the current 
level of the capital in the economy plays a dominant role for the determination of 
current wage, current market interest rate.  
With this in mind, it can be concluded that the presence of future capital 𝐾𝑡+1 
would determine future market interest rate 𝑟𝑡+1  that would be accounted as the 
investment of the economy for the economic growth. In this model, the fixed proportion 
for the government services is such that 𝐺𝑡 = 𝛷𝑌𝑡 , thus when in equilibrium it is see that 
that the total labour supply L =[(1 − 𝜇) + 𝜀𝜇] 𝑛, which is the sum of total labour supply 
of high income households 𝜀𝜇𝑛 and labour supply of low income households (1 − 𝜇)𝑛.7 
This model finds the government share in the economy through 𝐺 = Ψ𝐾𝜒𝛷  where 
Ψ = [𝐴(𝛷)𝛼𝐿𝛽]
1




The economy follows balanced budget condition tax revenues = G+(mw+sυw) 
and replacing the values of G and w gives the following relation: 
 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = Ψ[𝛷 + 𝛽(𝑚 + 𝑠υ)]𝐾𝜒  
According to growth theory, the presence of physical capital translates into 
investment of the economy; accumulation of physical capital comes from saving of the 
economy. The savings in an economy comes:  
 
7 This holds true when there is equilibrium in the labour market. 
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Households 
Low-income HH = (1 − 𝜇)𝑛𝑤  
High-income HH (honest) = 𝜇𝑛𝜀𝑤(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜏) 
High-income (HH)(dishonest)= 𝜃𝜆𝜇𝑛𝜀𝑤(1 − 𝑏 − 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)𝜏), (1 − 𝜆)𝜃𝜇𝑛𝜀𝑤(1 − 𝜏)  
Tax Collectors (Tier One Bureaucrats) 
𝐵1 Honest = [(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃(1 − 𝜆)]𝑚𝑤  




) 𝜀𝑤𝑏(1 − 𝜑)]} 
Super Auditors (Tier two Bureaucrats) 
𝐵2 Honest = (1 − 𝜃)𝑠𝜐𝑤 




Where saving equal future capital: 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡+1 
 
5.  GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
 
5.1.  Equilibrium with No Corruption 
In equilibrium with no corruption, total tax revenue collected in the economy is 
?̂?𝜇𝑛𝜀𝑤, which is used for payment of wages of tier one and tier two bureaucrats mw and sw 
respectively, and to provide public good and services 𝐺, which is utilised by the private firms. 








] ≡ ?̂? … … … … … … (15) 
Looking at this tax level the optimum tax rate, household’s willingness to pay the 
bribe would be 𝑏?̂? = [1 –  𝑝(1 − 𝜃)]?̂?𝑡 (from equation (12)). 
In equilibrium with no corruption λ=0, total savings of the economy come from 
the honest low-income individuals (1 − 𝜇)𝑛𝑤  and honest high-income households 
𝜇𝑛𝜀𝑤 (1 − ?̂?) . The savings of the tier one and tier two bureaucrats is 𝑚𝑤 and 𝑠𝜐𝑤 
respectively. Combining all these expressions together and replacing the values of ?̂? and 
algebraic manipulation gives: 
𝑤𝐿 − 𝐺 =   𝐾𝑡+1 … … … … … … (16) 
Using Equation (16) and replacing 𝐺 = Ψ𝐾𝜒𝛷  and 𝑤 = 𝛽𝐿−1Ψ𝐾𝜒 I get the 
following expression for the future accumulation of the physical capital: 
𝐾𝑡+1 = Ψ𝐾𝑡
𝜒[𝛽 − 𝛷] ≡ 𝐾(𝐾𝑡) … … … … … (17)  
As already established that ?̂?𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝛹𝐾𝑡
𝜒−1
, then from this it is 
determined ?̂?𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝛹𝐾𝑡+1
𝜒−1
, combing this relationship with equation (17) 
following relation is attained: 
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?̂?𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝛹 [𝛽 − 𝛷]
𝜒−1. 𝐾𝑡+1
𝜒(𝜒−1)   
≡ ?̂?(𝐾)  … … (18)  




≡ ?̂? … … … … … (19) 
 
5.2.  Equilibrium with Corruption 
In equilibrium with corruption, λ=1.  The total tax receipts come only from honest 
high-income households. Corruption happens when corrupt households meet with a 
corrupt tax collector. With probability (1 − 𝜃)[(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃(1 − 𝜆)] honest households 
meet up with honest tax collectors, with probability (1 − 𝜃) 𝜆𝜃 honest households meet 
up with corrupt tax collectors, corrupt households match with honest tax collector with 
probability 𝜃[(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃(1 − 𝜆)]. Combing all these three cases the total tax receipts 
submitted to the government equal ?̃?𝜇𝑛𝜀𝑤 ((1 − 𝜃2). When a corrupt household meets 
with corrupt tax collector with probability 𝜃2 and no tax receipts are submitted. 
A corrupt tax collector is caught with probability p (1-θ). He loses his corrupt 
income and is fined the amount that he has gained as illegal income. Once caught the 
corrupt tax collector has to pay the tax difference. Thus the revenues for the government 
coming from tax collector being caught is 𝑝?̃?𝜇𝑛𝜃2𝜆  and (𝑝 (1 − 𝜃))[𝑤(2 +  𝑟𝑡+1) +
(2 + 𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝜌)(
𝜇𝑛
𝑚
) 𝜃𝜀𝑤𝑏]. The cost of the effective audit is 𝑐𝜂?̃?𝜇𝑛 and for external audit 
is 𝑐𝜎?̃?𝜇𝑛. The cost is covered by the fine collected. The total cost and the fine are taken 
equal such that the government does not spend extra. Keeping all this in view, optimal 




 … … … … … … (20) 
 ?̃?𝑡 = [
𝛷𝐿+𝛽(𝑚+𝑠υ)
(1−𝜃2)𝜇𝑛𝜀𝛽 
] ≡ ?̃? … … … … … … (21) 
The optimum level of bribe that households are willing to pay and the tax 
collectors are willing to accept is ?̃?𝑡 = [1 –  𝑝 (1 − 𝜃)]?̃?𝑡 (from equation (13)). The total 
saving in such an economy comes from the corrupt as well as the honest agents. 
Combing all the savings expression of honest and dishonest households, tax 
collectors and tier two bureaucrats; replacing the value of ?̂? and algebraic manipulation 
gives the following relation: 
 𝐿𝑤 + 𝑚𝑤[1 − 𝑝𝜃(1 − 𝜃)] + 𝑠𝜐𝑤
(1−𝜃)
(1−𝜃2)
[𝐺 + w(𝑚 + 𝑠υ)][1 + 𝜃𝑝] 
      −𝜃𝜇𝑛εw?̃?𝑡{1 − θφ − [1 − 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)𝜃(1 − 𝜑)]} = 𝐾𝑡+1 … … (22) 
Working with equation (22) and replacing 𝑏?̂? = [1 –  𝑝(1 − 𝜃)]?̂?𝑡  , 𝐺 = Ψ𝐾
𝜒𝛷 
and 𝑤 = 𝛽𝐿−1Ψ𝐾𝜒  following capital accumulation exists in equilibrium with corruption: 





𝑚[1 − 𝑝𝜃(1 − 𝜃)] +
𝛽
𝐿
𝑠𝜐(1 − 𝜃𝑝) 






(𝑚 + 𝑠υ)] [1 + 𝜃𝑝] 
          −
𝜃𝜇𝑛ε𝛽?̃?
𝐿
[1 –  𝑝(1 − 𝜃)]{1 − θφ − [1 − 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)𝜃(1 − 𝜑)]}] … (23) 
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As 𝑟?̃? = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝛹𝐾𝑡
𝜒−1
, then from this it can derived that ?̃?𝑡+1 =
(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝛹𝐾𝑡+1
𝜒−1
, combining this relationship with equation (23) this model gets the 
following relation: 
 ?̃?𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)Ψ [Ψ [𝛽 +
𝛽
𝐿










𝑠υ)] [1 + 𝜃𝑝] −
𝜃𝜇𝑛ε𝛽?̃?
𝐿





≡ ?̃?(𝐾𝑡) … … … … … … (24) 




≡ ?̃? … … … … … … (25) 
 
6.  CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
6.1.  From Low Development to Corruption 
This model solidifies the relationship of corruption, capital accumulation and 
economic development already discussed in literature. What is of interest is to see 
whether at the equilibrium level, there is corruption or not, and what level of capital there 
is high growth, or low growth, in the economy, and if these levels are the same for both 
the equilibrium with and without corruption. 
From the Equations (18 and 26) this paper finds that ?̃?(𝐾)  and ?̂?(𝐾)  have 
monotonically downward function with respect to 𝐾. From equation (18), (19), (24) and 
(25) it is established that ?̃?(𝐾𝑡) > ?̂?(𝐾𝑡) and ?̃? < ?̂? for all values of 𝐾𝑡 .  Intuitively 
speaking this model says that future rate of return, as a function of K in a corrupt 
economy would be higher compared to the rate of return as a function of K in an 
economy with no corruption. Furthermore, ?̃?and ?̂? are not a function of K but depend 
upon the bargaining power of the bureaucrats, audit probability and corruption 
probability.  
As already pointed out in literature these three components are dependent on the 
institutional quality and vice versa. Keeping this view in mind, this model concludes that 
in the presence of corruption with the increase in probability of being caught or increase 
in bargaining power it would reduce ?̃?and it increase ?̂?. 
This paper find the optimum level of 𝐾𝑡, which defines a point in economy there is 
high growth. I define 𝐾1
𝐶and 𝐾2
𝐶 around that can defined as 𝐾𝑡 at which where they may 
be growth, low growth or multiple growth level. For all 𝐾𝑡 < 𝐾1
𝐶 , ?̂?(𝐾𝑡) > ?̂? and for all 
𝐾𝑡 > 𝐾1
𝐶 ,  ?̂?(𝐾𝑡) < ?̂?.  Similarly, for all 𝐾𝑡 < 𝐾2
𝐶 ,  ?̃?(𝐾𝑡) > ?̃?  and for all 𝐾𝑡 > 𝐾2
𝐶 , 





Proposition 1: For ∀ 𝐾𝑡 < 𝐾1
𝐶, there is a unique equilibrium where all corruptible 
bureaucrats are corrupt. For ∀ 𝐾𝑡 > 𝐾2
𝐶 , there is a unique equilibrium where no 
corruptible bureaucrat is corrupt. For ∀ 𝐾1
𝐶 < 𝐾𝑡 ≤ 𝐾2
𝐶there is multiple equilibrium. 
 
8See Figure 1. 
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6.2.  From Corruption to Low Development 
Two paths of capital accumulation has been identified one for equilibrium where 
there is no corruption and one for where there is corruption, 𝐾∗ and 𝐾∗. In equilibrium 
where there is no corruption, the economy moves on higher development path 𝐾 (∙) and 
thus has a high level of steady state equilibrium 𝐾𝐻 = {Ψ[𝛽 − 𝜙]}
1−𝜒  (from equation 
17). Whereas in equilibrium where there is corruption the economy moves on lower 













(𝑚 + 𝑠𝜐)} (1 + 𝜃𝑝) −
𝜃𝜇𝑛𝜀𝛽?̃?
𝐿
[1 − 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)]{1 −
𝜃𝜑 − [1 − 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)]𝜃(1 − 𝜑)}]]
1−𝜒
 (from Equation 23) 
 
Fig. 2.  Capital Accumulation 
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Intuition 




> 0 ), capital accumulation increases (
𝜕𝐾𝐿
𝜕𝜃
< 0). As the proportion 
of the corrupt individual increases, capital accumulation in a corrupt economy decreases. 
Furthermore, in an economy with corruption 𝐾∗  is not true indicator of capital 
accumulation, as a large amount of the income has not become part of the economy and 
not contribution towards economic growth and development. Figure 2 identifies 𝐾𝐿
∗ as a 
low level of capital accumulation and is found on the capital accumulation path of the 
economy with corruption. Where as 𝐾𝐻
∗  is the high capital accumulation level and is 
found on the capital accumulation path of economy with no corruption. 
 
7.  COMPARATIVE STATICS 
For a given level of physical capital 𝐾𝑡  in an equilibrium with or without 
corruption satisfy, ?̃? > ?̂?, ?̃? > ?̂?. For a given level of physical capital 𝐾 the optimum tax 
rate of the corrupt economy is higher than that of the equilibrium with no corruption, 
?̃?𝑡 > ?̂?𝑡as seen from equation (15) and (21), as of which ?̃?𝑡 > ?̂?𝑡 . Intuitively, this holds 
true for the government’s need to run a balanced budget, the revenues collected in 
equilibrium with corruption are lower than the expenditure. The government raises taxes 
to overcome the shortage. 
Similarly from Equation (17) and (23) I see that 𝐾𝑡+1 < 𝐾𝑡+1and Equations 
(18) and (24) clearly show that ?̃?𝑡+1 < ?̂?𝑡+1 . Together this establishes that in 
equilibrium with corruption the level of taxes is high because of which the cost of 
concealment in the shape of bribe is also high. Furthermore, the accumulation of the 
physical capital is lower compared to the equilibrium with no corruption, and the rate 
of interest is also high. In equilibrium with corruption, the level of taxes is high due 
to which households pay a large bribe to evade taxes, which leads to low saving and 
capital accumulation. In equilibrium with no corruption, the taxes are not high such 
that all households pay the taxes. Their savings are high enough for capital 
accumulation and economic growth. When the rate of capital accumulation is high 
the rate of interest associated with it is low, this is due to diminishing marginal 
returns to capital. 
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
This paper adds to the existing literature on how corruption in weak decentralised 
institutions affects economic growth and development through tax evasion and capital 
accumulation.  
The basic setup for the corrupt bureaucrat is the same but the model introduced 
in this paper introduces a multi-level tax administrative system, where tier two 
bureaucrats and tax collectors are both involved in double incidences of corruption. 
Furthermore, this model shows that the households bribe the tax collector , who in 
turn offer bribes to their tier two bureaucrats. The transfer of resources creates illegal 
income, which is not included in savings. The reduced savings result  in lower capital 
investment of economy.  
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This paper treats legal income differently from corruption income. Corruption 
creates unfavourable conditions for investment in physical capital and thus growth. 
Blackburn, et al. (2010) and Wadho (2009) look at a single public office tier. This model 
is a further extension of the model discussed in Blackburn, et al. (2010) and Wadho 
(2009) with two government tiers, which implies that the share of the bureaucrats has 
decreased while the proportion of the illegal income is same. There is fixed value of 
bribes that are shared among the bureaucrats. If the number of bureaucrats were to 
increase, then the share of each bureaucrat would decrease, as now the bribe would have 
to be divided into more shares. Increase in the number of bureaucrats could lead to both 
negative and positive effects.  
Taking the multiple tiers may also increase the size of the bribe. This could be 
done when the tier two bureaucrats ask a particular percentage of bribes from tax 
collectors who in return will ask for higher bribes from households by framing them. If 
there were ‘n’ number of tiers, the negative effect will appear in the form of a smaller 
share in the bribe. The positive effect will appear because when there are more corrupt 
bureaucrats, there would be framing and extortion. There might be optimal level of ‘n’. 
This paper does not focus on the number of tiers but rather on how corruption affects 
economic development through savings and physical capital investment. 
Low investment in capital becomes visible as low economic growth and 
development. This paper explains how corruption accompanies low growth and 
development, and how low development accompanies high corruption. Although this 
paper has tried to explain the corruption and economic growth relationship through 
theoretical models, further research will be helpful. Pakistan, as a developing country, 
needs to direct its resources to strengthen its rules and regulation for better accountability 
and efficiency. This paper tries to give a clearer explanation for the reasons why the tax 
revenue for an economy like Pakistan is low.  
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